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Abstract	  
What	  is	  the	  long	  term	  effect	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  (CCT)	  on	  labor	  and	  migration	  decisions?	  There	  
is	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  support	  short	  run	  positive	  effects	  of	  CCT	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  nutrition,	  health	  and	  
schooling.	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  on	  their	  long	  term	  effects	  on	  labor	  and	  migration	  decisions.	  
The	  experimental	  data	  is	  limited	  for	  this	  purpose.	  I	  examine	  the	  short	  and	  long	  term	  effects	  of	  Progresa-­‐
Oportunidades	  on	  migration	  using	  a	  regression	  discontinuity	  design.	  The	  paper	  identifies	  the	  effects	  of	  
the	  program	  among	  villages	  with	  poverty	  levels	  close	  to	  the	  cutoff	  point	  of	  the	  original	  eligibility	  criteria.	  
The	   estimates	   show	   that	   the	   program	   caused	   a	   drop	   in	   the	   population	   size	   and	   changed	   the	   gender	  
composition	   of	   Mexican	   rural	   villages	   between	   1997	   and	   2005.	   Migration	   of	   fully	   covered	   village	  
accounts	   for	   a	   reduction	   of	   10	   percentage	   points	   during	   the	   period.	   The	   reduction	   of	   males	   is	  
significantly	  higher	  than	  for	  females,	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  its	  effect	  on	  migration	  decisions.	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What	  is	  the	  long	  term	  effect	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  (CCT)	  on	  labor	  and	  migration	  decisions?	  What	  
is	   the	   effect	   of	   CCT	   programs	   on	   the	   demographic	   composition	   of	   recipient	   households	   of	   poor	   rural	  
villages?	  CCT	  programs	  have	  demonstrated	  to	  enhance	  human	  capital	   investments	  of	  poor	   families	  by	  
increasing	  nutrition,	  health	  and	  schooling	  levels	  of	  poor	  families.	  
CCT	   programs	   have	   become	   a	   very	   popular	   around	   the	   world	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   Progresa-­‐
Oportunidades,	  the	  pioneer	  Mexican	  CCT	  program	  that	  started	  in	  1997.	  Its	  unique	  experimental	  design	  
showed	  evidence	  of	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  tacking	  poverty.	  This	  evidence	  facilitates	  the	  implementation	  of	  
CCT	  in	  many	  different	  countries	  and	  regions,	  including	  Argentina,	  China,	  Colombia,	  Honduras,	  Indonesia,	  
Jamaica	   and	   Nicaragua.	   Some	   others	   like	   Turkey,	   India,	   Pakistan	   and	   Philippines	   are	   also	   using	   cash	  
transfers	  as	  the	  main	  strategy	  for	  development.	  In	  general,	  these	  programs	  distributes	  cash	  to	  mothers	  
conditional	   on	   their	   children	   being	   enrolled	   in	   school	   and	   engaging	   in	   a	   series	   of	   health-­‐promoting	  
activities	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   equipping	   them	   with	   human	   capital	   needed	   to	   break	   the	   inter-­‐
generational	   transmission	   of	   poverty.	   However,	   there	   little	   evidence	   on	   the	   long	   term	   effects	   of	   CCT	  
programs,	   particularly	   their	   effects	   on	   the	   demographic	   trends,	   including	   fertility	   and	  migration.	   The	  
empirical	  importance	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  unsolved,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  short	  period	  since	  their	  expansion	  
and	  short	  period	  of	  analysis.	  
This	  paper	  tests	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  CCT	  programs	  are	  accelerating	  the	  demographic	  transition	  of	  poor	  
by	   increasing	   migration	   and	   reducing	   the	   fertility	   rates	   of	   beneficiaries,	   particularly	   for	   population	  
located	  close	  to	  the	  margin	  of	  eligibility.	  I	  use	  the	  administrative	  records	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  and	  
the	  original	  set	  of	  villages	  used	  for	  designing	  the	  original	  rollout	  plan	  of	  program.	  I	  examine	  the	  sudden	  
drop	  in	  the	  population	  size	  and	  change	  in	  the	  gender	  composition	  of	  rural	  villages	  where	  the	  program	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was	  implemented	  between	  1997	  and	  2005.	  To	  identify	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  on	  migration,	   I	  use	  a	  
regression	   discontinuity	   design	   of	   the	   poverty	   index	   used	   to	   determine	  what	   villages	  were	   eligible	   in	  
1997.	   I	   find	   that	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2005	   the	   average	   population	   size	   in	   a	   fully	   covered	   village	  
decreased	   by	   10	   percentage	   points	   as	   consequence	   of	   the	   increase	   of	   migration,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	  
reduction	  in	  the	  fertility	  rate.	  This	  reduction	  is	  statistically	  significant	  higher	  for	  males	  than	  for	  females,	  
which	  indicates	  a	  migration	  pattern	  of	  the	  adult	  population	  in	  those	  villages	  covered	  by	  the	  program.	  
The	  short	  term	  effects	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  migration	  have	  been	  studied	  during	  the	  previous	  
years.	  The	  experimental	  data	  has	  been	  analyzed	  and	  provides	  not	  conclusive	  evidence	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  
CCT	  on	  migration	  on	  the	  short	  run.	  Scholars	  have	  found	  opposite	  result	  using	  the	  same	  data.	  Stecklov,	  
Winters,	  Stampini,	  and	  Davis	  (2005)	  found	  a	  short	  run	  positive	  effect	  on	  national	  migration	  and	  no	  effect	  
on	  the	  international.	  Angelucci	  (2005)	  uses	  a	  similar	  technique	  with	  different	  specification	  and	  shows	  an	  
opposite	  finding:	  “Overall,	  the	  program	  generates	  an	  increase	  in	  international	  migration	  but	  no	  change	  
in	  domestic	  migration	  (P.	  14)”.	  Ruvalcaba	  (2005)	  finds	  a	  positive	  and	  significant	  effect	   in	  both	  national	  
and	   international	   migration	   by	   using	   a	   third	   synthetic	   comparison	   group	   created	   in	   2003.	   All	   these	  
results	  are	  mainly	  based	  on	   the	  short	   term	  effect	  of	   the	  program	  and	  none	  of	   them	  has	  analyzed	   the	  
long	   term	   effects.	   The	   large	   scale	   experiment	   is	   limited	   on	   this	   regard.	   It	   only	   provides	   evidence	  
differences	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  -­‐18	  months-­‐.	  As	  consequence,	  long	  term	  evidence	  requires	  the	  use	  
of	  alternative	  identification	  methods.	  	  
The	   contribution	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   two	   folded.	   First,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   to	   provide	   estimations	   using	   the	  
discontinuity	   in	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   program	   to	   test	   long	   term	  effects	   of	   the	   CCT.	   Second,	   there	   is	   a	  
current	   debate	   on	   the	   long	   run	   effects	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   CCT	   in	   reducing	   poverty.	   If	   CCT	   are	  
extremely	   effective,	   we	   should	   expect	   a	   significant	   increase	   of	   migration	   if	   recipients	   increase	   their	  
human	  capital	  and	  look	  for	  a	  more	  productive	  occupation.	  However,	  this	  could	  have	  other	  consequences	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for	   the	   destinations	   where	   those	   recipients	   decide	   to	  migrate.	   This	   is	   a	   potential	   paradox,	   since	   the	  
success	  of	  the	  program	  could	  represent	  a	  major	  public	  policy	  problem	  if	  beneficiaries	  who	  migrate	  find	  
difficult	  to	  be	  assimilated	  in	  new	  labor	  markets.	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  CCT	  on	  labor	  mobility	  is	  
its	  early	  stages,	  so	  this	  paper	  could	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  this	  arena.	  
The	   rest	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   Section	   II	   describes	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   used	   to	  
construct	   the	   working	   hypothesis	   to	   be	   tested.	   Section	   III	   provides	   a	   brief	   description	   of	   the	   main	  
features	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades.	  Section	  IV	  lays	  out	  the	  types	  of	  data	  used	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Section	  V	  
shows	   the	   identification	   strategy:	  difference	   in	  difference	  and	   regression	  discontinuity	  design	   close	   to	  
the	  original	  eligibility	  criteria	  used	  for	  the	  section	  of	  the	  villages	  included	  in	  the	  original	  rollout	  plan	  of	  
the	   program.	   Section	   VI	   shows	   the	   estimated	   impacts	   of	   the	   program	   on	   the	   two	   variables	   used	   to	  
approximate	  migration.	  Section	  VII	  concludes.	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Conceptual	  Framework.	  Cash	  transfers	  and	  their	  effect	  in	  demographic	  trends	  	  
2.1	  Working	  Theory	  
This	   paper	   tests	   the	   theoretical	   effect	   of	   a	   program	   that	   includes	   a	   cash	   transfer	   conditioned	   on	  
assistance	  to	  school	  and	  better	  health	  habits	  will	   increase	  human	  capital	  of	  beneficiaries	  on	  migration.	  
In	  particular,	   I	  will	   test	   if	   beneficiaries	  will	   try	  o	   search	   for	   an	  occupation	  with	  higher	   returns	  outside	  
their	  villages	  where	  they	  were	  born.	  
The	  effect	  of	  a	  CCT	  programs	  on	  migration	  depends	  on	  the	  age	  and	  cohort	  of	  beneficiaries.	  The	  increase	  
of	  human	  capital	  of	  older	  cohorts	   -­‐who	  were	  out	  of	   school	  after	   the	  program	   initiates-­‐	   is	  very	   limited	  
and	   it	   is	   only	   affected	   by	   the	   better	   provision	   of	   health	   services.	   They	   benefit	   of	   the	   transfer	   by	  
increasing	  consumption,	  which	  makes	  them	  less	   likely	  to	  abandon	  their	  communities.	  Younger	  cohorts	  
receive	  better	  health	  services,	  increase	  their	  nutrition	  levels	  during	  the	  critical	  early	  childhood	  years	  and	  
increase	   their	   schooling	   levels,	   which	   make	   them	   more	   likely	   to	   increase	   their	   productivity	   during	  
adulthood	  [See	  Cunha	  and	  Heckman	  (2007)].	  These	  cohorts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  higher	  incentives	  to	  
abandon	  their	  villages	  of	  origin	  and	  find	  an	  occupation	  in	  a	  different	  labor	  market.	  	  
To	  analyze	  this	  difference	  I	  will	  use	  a	  simple	  model	  of	  migration	  developed	  by	  Borjas	  (1987)	  and	  refined	  
by	  Chiquiar	  and	  Hanson	  (2004).	  Both	  use	  the	  Roy	  Model	  of	  negative	  selection	  migration	  from	  a	  country	  
with	   relative	   high	   returns	   to	   skill	   in	   comparison	   with	   other	   with	   lower	   returns.	   Individuals	   with	  
intermediate	  and	   lower	   levels	  of	  human	  capital	  would	  have	  more	   incentives	   to	  migrate	  depending	  on	  
the	  modeling	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  migration.	  If	  costs	  are	  constant,	  we	  would	  expect	  an	  increase	  of	  migration	  of	  
individuals	   in	   the	   lower	   part	   of	   the	   distribution.	   But	   if	   cost	   is	   increasing	   according	   to	   the	   educational	  
levels,	   then	  we	  would	   expect	  migration	   only	   from	   individuals	   located	   in	   the	   intermediate	   part	   of	   the	  
distribution.	   Chiquiar	   (2004)	   show	   negative	   selection	   can	   be	   overturned	   if	   the	   cost	   of	   migration	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increases	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  education.	  In	  fact,	  the	  relaxation	  of	  constant	  cost	  of	  migration	  can	  result	  
in	  having	  positive	  or	  negative	  selection	  in	  terms	  of	  skill,	  particularly	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  migration.	  	  
2.1.1	  The	  model	  
Decision	  of	  migration	  is	  taken	  only	  one	  time	  in	  life.	  Those	  who	  decide	  to	  stay	  in	  their	  local	  communities	  
are	   indexed	  by	  0	  and	   those	  who	  decide	   to	   leave	  are	   indexed	  by	  1.	   So,	   the	   first	  group	   face	   the	  next	  a	  
wage	  equation	  	  
Sw oo δµ +=)ln( 0 	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
	  
where:	  
• w0	  	  is	  the	  wage	  in	  the	  village	  of	  origin	  
• μ0	  	  is	  the	  base	  wage	  in	  the	  village	  of	  origin	  
• S	  is	  the	  level	  of	  schooling	  
As	   pointed	   by	   Borjas	   (1987)	   and	   Chiquiar	   (2006),	   the	   focus	   must	   be	   in	   observable	   skills,	   in	   specific	  
schooling.	   There	  are	   random	  components	   to	  wage	  determination,	  but	   for	   simplicity	   such	   features	  are	  
not	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Similarly,	  those	  who	  decide	  their	  villages	  or	  communities	  face	  the	  following	  
equation.	  	  
Sw 111)ln( δµ += 	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  
where:	  
• w1	  	  is	  the	  wage	  in	  the	  destination	  village	  
• μ1	  	  is	  the	  base	  wage	  in	  the	  destination	  village	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It	   is	  normally	  assumed	   that	   returns	   to	   schooling	   in	   the	   local	  village	  are	  higher	   in	  comparison	  with	   the	  
destination.1	  In	  other	  words	  δ0	  >δ1.	  The	  cost	  of	  migration	  is	  defined	  as	  C	  and	  it	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  hours	  
of	  work	  to	  estimate	  the	  equivalence	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  full	  income.	  This	  last	  can	  be	  expressed	  as:	  
0w
C
=π 	  .	  
This	  allows	  us	  to	  express	  the	  difference	  between	  wages	  as:	  
πδµδµ −−−+=+− SSCww 001101 )ln()ln( 	   	   	   (3)	  
Those	  who	  decide	  to	  migrate	  must	  have	  a	  positive	  gain	  of	  doing	  it.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  sign	  of	  equation	  3	  is	  
positive.	   The	   difference	   in	   salaries	   and	   the	   specific	   return	   to	   schooling	  must	   compensate	   the	   cost	   of	  
migration.	  This	  can	  be	  formally	  expressed	  as:	  	  
ππδµδµ −−≈−−−+=+− )ln()ln()ln()ln( 01001101 wwSSCww 	   	   (4)	  
As	   it	   is	  mentioned	   before,	   it	   is	   feasible	   to	   relax	   the	   assumption	   of	   constant	   cost	   as	   expressed	   in	   the	  
previous	  equation	  and	  instead	  using	  time-­‐equivalent	  migration	  costs	  decrease	  with	  schooling,	  such	  that:	  
ππ δµπ +=)ln( 	   	   	   	   	   (5)	  
Chiquiar	   (2006)	   derive	   this	   expression	   by	   making	   two	   assumptions.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   standard	   cost	   of	  
information	  and	  the	  relative	  lower	  cost	  for	  those	  with	  higher	  income	  in	  time	  equivalent	  wage	  units.	  The	  
second	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  individuals	  would	  require	  borrowing	  money	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  the	  cost	  
of	   migration.	   So	   those	   individuals	   with	   credit	   constraints	   will	   be	   impeded	   to	   get	   it.	   This	   is	   true	   for	  
individuals	   in	   the	   lowest	   part	   of	   the	   wage	   distribution,	   who	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   have	   access	   to	   credit	  
markets,	  both	  formal	  and	  informal.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  general,	  the	  problems	  of	  supply	  of	  education	  in	  the	  region/country	  of	  origin	  are	  not	  analyzed	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  
8	  
	  
If	  we	  combine	  the	  equations	  1	  to	  5	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	   find	  the	  cutoff	  points	  of	   the	  population	  with	  
higher	  incentives	  to	  migrate.	  The	  case	  of	  constant	  cost	  gives	  us	  only	  one	  cutoff	  point	  with	  only	  negative	  
selection.	  However,	  if	  we	  use	  the	  decreasing	  cost	  of	  migration	  we	  can	  derive	  the	  following	  conditions:	  
1. 0>πδ 	  	   	  
2. πµµµ e>− 01 	  
Figure	  A	  of	  the	  Model	  Appendix	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  population	  that	  migrates	  and	  the	  one	  that	  not.	  
Time	  equivalence	  cost	  of	  migration	  represents	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  full	  income	  and	  it	  is	  decreasing	  with	  
schooling.	  There	  are	  two	  cutoff	  points:	  SL	  and	  SU.	  The	  first	   refers	  to	  the	   lowest	   level	  of	  education	  that	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  migration	  cost;	  the	  second	  refers	  to	  the	  individuals	  with	  education	  level	  L	  
who	  are	  indifferent	  between	  staying	  and	  leaving	  their	  communities.	  	  
Individuals	  to	  the	  left	  of	  SL	  and	  to	  the	  right	  of	  SU	  decide	  to	  stay	  in	  their	  communities.	  The	  figure	  assumes	  
that	   the	  mean	   schooling	   level	   ( )S is	  between	   these	   two	  values.	   This	   selection	  of	  migrants	   in	   terms	  of	  
observable	  variables	   is	   related	   to	   the	  distribution	  of	   schooling	   in	   the	  country.	  According	   to	   the	  graph,	  
two	  are	  three	  possible	  cases	  in	  the	  migration	  phenomenon:	  	  
• Negative	  selection.	  Those	   individuals	  who	  are	  between	   S 	   and	  SL.	  This	  population	  has	  a	   lower	  
level	   of	   schooling	   than	   the	   upper	   part	   of	   the	   distribution.	   However,	   their	   schooling	   level	   is	  
higher	  than	  those	  of	  the	  lowest	  part	  of	  the	  total	  distribution.	  	  
• Positive	  selection.	  Those	  individuals	  who	  are	  between	  SL	  and	  SU.	  This	  is	  the	  population	  with	  high	  
levels	  of	  schooling,	  but	  not	  the	  highest	  of	  the	  distribution.	  	  
The	  final	  effect	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  both	  types	  of	  selections:	   If	   the	  majority	   is	   from	  the	  
lowest	  distribution,	  then	  the	  expected	  selection	  is	  going	  to	  be	  negative,	  while	  if	  the	  majority	  if	  from	  the	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right	  distribution,	  we	  will	  have	  positive	  selection.	  If	  the	  proportion	  is	  the	  same,	  then	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  
distribution	  as	  “intermediate	  selection”.	  
There	  are	  some	  caveats	  of	  this	  model.	  One	  of	  them	  is	  recognized	  by	  the	  authors	  and	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  
non-­‐inclusion	  of	  informational	  networks.	  The	  more	  information	  an	  individual	  has,	  the	  lower	  the	  cost	  of	  
migration,	  especially	  for	  low	  income	  workers	  who	  have	  relatives	  and	  friends	  with	  an	  occupation	  in	  the	  
other	  labor	  markets.	  The	  other	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  frictions	  of	  the	  education	  market	  in	  the	  country/village	  
of	   origin.	   While	   people	   would	   like	   to	   stay	   at	   school,	   supply	   is	   very	   restricted	   or	   null,	   which	   forces	  
individuals	   to	   migrate.	   Although	   the	   existence	   of	   these	   caveats,	   I	   will	   next	   provide	   some	   extensions	  
derived	  from	  CCT	  programs	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  migration	  decisions.	  	  
2.1.2	  CCT	  and	  Migration	  in	  the	  sort	  and	  long	  run.	  Theoretical	  working	  hypothesis	  
CCT	  programs	  have	  different	  theoretical	  effects	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  migrate	  for	  the	  long	  and	  short	  runs.	  In	  
both	  cases	  the	  benefit	  is	  related	  to	  horizon	  of	  analysis:	  immediate	  transfers	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  direct	  
increase	  in	  the	  disposable	  income	  of	  individuals	  who	  would	  decide	  to	  leave	  their	  villages,	  especially	  the	  
generation	  who	  is	  out	  of	  school.	  The	  cash	  transfer	  may	  reduce	  the	  constraint	  faced	  by	  poor	  households	  
and	  members	  may	  use	  the	  extra	  income	  to	  fund	  the	  migration	  process.	  Once	  again,	  the	  final	  effect	  is	  not	  
the	   same	   for	   households:	   only	   those	   households	   in	   the	   extreme	   portion	   of	   the	   distribution	   -­‐the	   less	  
poor-­‐	  will	  be	  able	  to	  do	  this.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   investments	   in	   human	   capital	   derived	   from	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   expenditures	   on	  
health,	   nutrition	   and	  education	   forced	  by	  CCT	  programs	  will	   give	   younger	   cohorts	  more	   incentives	   to	  
find	  an	  occupation	  with	  higher	  returns	  once	  they	  complete	  their	  education.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
not	  all	  beneficiaries	  will	  be	  in	  the	  same	  situation:	  those	  in	  the	  extreme	  income	  distribution	  will	  not	  be	  
able	  to	   increase	  their	   income	  such	  as	   it	  would	  be	  feasible	  to	  fund	  a	  possible	  migration	  decision,	  while	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those	   who	   were	   in	   the	   margin	   of	   the	   distribution	   will	   be	   more	   able	   to	   do	   it.	   For	   example,	   if	   two	  
individuals	  have	  the	  same	  educational	  level	  but	  one	  of	  them	  is	  living	  in	  a	  poorer	  household,	  the	  other	  is	  
more	  likely	  to	  move	  to	  a	  location	  that	  pays	  highest	  relative	  wages,	  net	  of	  moving	  costs.	  
In	   order	   to	   include	   these	   elements	   in	   to	   the	   previous	  model,	   we	  must	   change	   the	   cost	   of	  migration	  
expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   units	   of	   labor.	   I	   will	   only	   use	   the	   model	   with	   decreasing	   costs.	   This	   allows	  
expressing	  equation	  5	  as	  follows.	  
CTSPoor −+= ')|'ln( ππ δµπ 	  	   	   	   (6)	  
Where:	  
• S'	  is	  the	  level	  of	  schooling	  increased	  by	  the	  program	  
• CT	  is	  the	  value	  of	  the	  cash	  transfer	  
This	  change	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  B,	  included	  in	  the	  Model	  Appendix.	  Note	  that	  this	  change	  only	  affects	  
those	   individuals	   included	   in	   the	   program	   -­‐below	   the	   poverty	   threshold-­‐	   and	   not	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
population.	  Higher	   levels	  of	  education	  derived	  from	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  CCT	  programs	  will	  change	  the	  
margin	   at	   which	   people	   decide	   to	   migrate.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   beneficiaries	   will	   be	   in	   the	  
possibility	   of	   leaving	   their	   communities,	   but	   only	   those	  who	   are	   less	   poor.	   This	   change	   in	   the	   cost	   of	  
migrating	  changes	  the	  equation	  of	  decision	  for	  the	  poor	  population	  as:	  
• ππ <' 	  
• '01 ππ
µµµµ ee >>− 	  
The	   reduction	   of	   the	   cost	   to	   migrate	   gives	   individuals	   at	   the	   margin	   the	   opportunity	   to	   leave	   their	  
communities	  and	  find	  an	  occupation	  in	  other	  labor	  market	  different	  than	  the	  one	  in	  their	  village.	  The	  left	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cutoff	  point	  of	  the	  distribution	   is	  now	  at	  S'L.	  This	  means	  that	  that	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  is	  only	  on	  the	  
beneficiaries	  of	  the	  program.	  The	  empirical	  strategy	  tests	  this	  theoretical	  hypothesis.	  
2.1	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  
Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  is	  the	  pioneer	  CCT	  program.	  It	  was	  implemented	  in	  1997	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  
breaking	   intergenerational	   transmission	  of	   poverty	   by	   investing	   in	   food,	   health	   and	  education	  of	   new	  
generations.	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  poverty	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  result	  of	  low	  acquisition	  of	  capabilities	  that	  
translates	   into	   bad	   functioning	   during	   adulthood,	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	   replicated	  during	   the	  
past	  generations.	  	  
The	   program	  was	   created	   in	   1997	   under	   the	   name	   of	   Programa	   de	   Educación,	   Salud	   y	   Alimentación	  
(Progresa).	  The	  initial	  design	   included	  only	  rural	  villages.	  Public	  officials	   in	  charge	  of	  the	  program	  used	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  partial	  census	  1995	  and	  the	  poverty	  index	  of	  the	  same	  year	  to	  determine	  the	  original	  
rollout	   plan.	   It	  was	   designed	   to	   cover	   the	   rural	   poorest	   villages	   in	  Mexico	   from	   1997	   to	   2003.	   It	   had	  
three	  main	  components:	  
1. Health	  and	  nutrition	  services	  
2. Food	  subsidy	  in	  cash	  equivalent	  to	  35	  kilograms	  of	  tortillas	  per	  month.	  
3. Educational	  cash	  transfer	  for	  basic	  education.	  
The	   first	   two	   refers	   to	   the	   a	   basic	   plan	   of	   preventive	   about	   health	   care,	   pregnancy	   care,	   nutritional	  
supplements,	  and	  bimonthly	   cash	   subsidy	   to	   improve	  nutritional	   levels	  of	   children.	  Educational	  grants	  
are	  provided	  to	  each	  member	  of	  the	  household	  under	  twenty	  one	  years	  old.	  Children	  must	  be	  registered	  
full-­‐time	  in	  school	  between	  the	  third	  grade	  of	  primary	  school	  and	  the	  third	  year	  of	  intermediate	  school.	  
The	   idea	  of	   the	  educational	  grant	   is	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	  opportunity	   cost	  of	   child	  work	  or	   children	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working	   in	   the	   household.	   The	   amount	   of	  money	   is	   received	   by	   the	  mother	   in	   the	   household	   and	   it	  
varies	  depending	  on	  year	  of	  schooling	  and	  the	  gender	  composition	  of	  children.	  	  
The	  grant	  is	  higher	  for	  females	  in	  secondary	  and	  high	  school.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  difference	  is	  to	  reduce	  
the	  gap	  of	  the	  in	  school	  attendance	  by	  gender	  given	  that	  females	  tend	  to	  leave	  their	  studies	  in	  greater	  
numbers	  and	  at	  an	  earlier	  ages	   than	  males.	  Also,	   the	  cap	   is	  designed	  to	   reduce	   incentives	   to	   increase	  
fertility.	  Beneficiaries	  are	  required	  to	  take	  preventive	  care	  and	  attend	  at	  least	  85%	  of	  classes	  in	  order	  to	  
receive	  the	  cash	  transfer,	  which	  is	  given	  directly	  to	  the	  mother	  of	  the	  household.	  The	  full	  description	  of	  
this	  benefit	  is	  included	  in	  Table	  A	  of	  the	  Data	  Appendix.2	  The	  design,	  implementation	  and	  resources	  are	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  federal	  government,	  but	  the	  program	  also	  involves	  the	  local	  governments	  in	  the	  
provision	  of	  health	  and	  educational	  services.	  Also	  the	  civil	  society	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  program	  through	  the	  
organization	   of	   “Asambleas	   Comunitarias”	   that	   participate	   in	   the	   selection	   and	   incorporation	   of	   the	  
benefited	  households.	  
In	  2002	  the	  program	  was	  redesigned	  and	  expanded	  to	  urban	  and	  semi-­‐urban	  villages	  under	  the	  name	  
Programa	   de	   Desarrollo	   Humano	   Oportunidades.	   This	   expansion	   included	   a	   redefinition	   of	   the	  
methodology	  followed	  to	  select	  the	  eligible	  households,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  urban	  areas	  and	  the	  extension	  
of	  the	  educational	  grants	  to	  the	  intermediate	  and	  higher	  education.	  This	  paper	  only	  includes	  the	  original	  
expansion	  of	  the	  program	  in	  rural	  villages	  between	  1997	  and	  2003.	  	  
Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   has	   shown	   to	   be	   efficient	   in	   terms	   of	   poverty	   reduction.	   The	   large	   academic	  
work	   focused	   on	   CCT	   is	   mainly	   based	   on	   large	   scale	   field	   experiment	   implemented	   for	   18	   months	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  more	  details	  see	  http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/	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between	  1998	  and	  2000	  that	  included	  random	  provision	  of	  the	  program	  in	  villages	  of	  ten	  states	  of	  the	  
country.3	  Scholars	  have	  found	  causal	  evidence	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  program.	  This	  includes:	  	  
• Positive	   effect	   the	   school	   attendance	   of	   both	   boys	   and	   girls	   in	   primary,	   secondary	   and	   high-­‐
school	  
1. Boys	  in	  secondary	  school:	  8	  %	  (0.64	  additional	  years)	  
2. Girls	   in	   secondary	   school:	   14%	   (0.72	   additional	   years).	   This	   represents	   10%	   of	   additional	  
education	  
• Negative	  impact	  on	  children's	  labor	  market	  (boys)	  
• Effectiveness	  in	  keeping	  children	  in	  school	  especially	  during	  the	  critical	  transition	  from	  primary	  
to	  secondary	  
• Reduced	  stunting	  among	  children	  1-­‐3	  years	  of	  age	  
• 12%	  lower	  incidence	  of	  illness	  in	  children	  ages	  0-­‐5	  
The	  implementation	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  coincides	  with	  the	  reduction	  of	  poverty	  levels	  in	  Mexico	  
since	  1997	  [Szekely	  (2004)].	  The	  increase	  of	  disposable	   income	  of	  poor	  families	  has	  alleviated	  some	  of	  
the	   basic	   needs	   of	   the	   poor	   families.	   However,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   program	   is	   to	   reduce	   poverty	  
conditions	  and	  expand	  capabilities	  of	  beneficiaries	  throughout	  their	  life	  cycles.	  This	  it	  is	  highly	  relevant	  
to	  evaluate	  the	  long	  term	  effects	  of	  the	  program,	  particularly	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  labor	  mobility	  of	  young	  
beneficiaries.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3For	  more	  information	  about	  the	  results	  of	  the	  program	  see:	  IFPRI,	  Is	  Progresa	  Working?	  Summary	  of	  the	  Results	  of	  




The	   eligibility	   criteria	   used	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	   program	   for	   the	   rural	   areas	   was	   based	   on	   the	  
Marginalization	  Index	  1995	  or	  povery	  index	  (Indice	  de	  Marginacion)	  created	  by	  the	  Mexican	  Population	  
Council	   (CONAPO).	   It	   is	   based	   on	   the	   results	   of	   the	   partial	   census	   of	   1995.	   Other	   criteria	   included	  
availability	  of	  schools	  and	  clinics	  to	  the	  eligible	  population.4	  	  
The	  Index	  1995	  measures	  the	  degree	  of	  marginalization	  of	  every	  village	  included	  in	  the	  partial	  census.	  It	  
has	   nine	   components	   that	   describe	   level	   of	   education,	   quality	   of	   housing	   and	   public	   services,	  
urbanization	  and	  income	  of	  the	  population	  living	  in	  two	  categories	  of	  villages,	  urban	  and	  rural.5	  It	  has	  a	  
continuous	  distribution.	  Its	  distribution	  is	  used	  to	  classify	  every	  village	  into	  five	  levels	  of	  marginalization:	  
very	   low,	   low,	  medium-­‐range,	   high,	   and	   very	   high.	   A	   complete	   description	   of	   the	   components,	   their	  
weight	  in	  the	  index	  and	  the	  cutoff	  values	  are	  included	  in	  Tables	  B,	  C	  and	  D	  of	  the	  Data	  Appendix.	  	  
The	  original	  plan	  for	  the	  rollout	  of	  Progresa	  was	  designed	  with	  18	  phases	  during	  a	  period	  of	  six	  years,	  
from	  1998	  to	  2003.6	   It	  only	   included	  rural	  villages	  classified	   in	  the	  middle,	  high	  and	  very	  high	   levels	  of	  
marginalization.	   This	   criteria	   rule	   would	   work	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   estimate	   causal	   effects	   of	   the	  
program.	  The	  continuous	  distribution	  of	  the	  index	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  comparison	  groups	  around	  the	  
cutoff	   point	   of	   the	   eligibility.	   Villages	   classified	  with	   low	  marginalization,	   but	   very	   close	   to	   the	   cutoff	  
value	  can	  work	  as	  a	  comparison	  group	  of	  those	  who	  just	  qualified	  to	  the	  program	  (treatment	  group).	  	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  a	  regression	  discontinuity	  design	  (RDD)	  to	  estimate	  the	  
effect	  of	  the	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  migration	  patterns.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Schools	  and	  clinics	  are	  key	  components	  of	  the	  program	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  provision	  makes	  impossible	  to	  comply	  
with	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  program	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  
5	  The	  criteria	  used	  for	  this	  classification	  is	  the	  total	  population	  living	  in	  the	  village.	  The	  threshold	  for	  a	  rural	  village	  
is	  2,500	  inhabitants.	  
6	  Secretaría	  de	  Desarrollo	  Social	  (1996).	  Resultados	  del	  Programa	  de	  Salud	  y	  Educación	  (PASE),	  mimeo.	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The	  validity	  of	  all	  different	  RD	  techniques	  relies	  on	  the	   local	  continuity	  assumption	  which	  says	  that,	   in	  
the	  absence	  of	  treatment,	  outcome	  variables	  would	  be	  continuous	  functions	  of	  the	  assignment	  variable.	  
This	  last	  variable	  is	  the	  marginalization	  index	  1995	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	  villages.	  The	  
two	  following	  subsections	  describe	  the	  analysis	  to	  identify	  RD.	  	  
4.1	  Why	  not	  to	  use	  the	  experimental	  framework	  for	  long	  term	  effects	  
The	   majority	   of	   the	   academic	   research	   focused	   on	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   is	   based	   on	   the	   random	  
experiment	   designed	   to	   estimate	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   program	   on	   health,	   nutrition	   and	   educational	  
outcomes.	   Mexican	   authorities	   took	   advantage	   of	   phase	   expansion	   and	   chose	   a	   random	   sample	   of	  
villages	  that	  were	  incorporated	  in	  phase	  1	  of	  the	  program	  in	  1998	  (treatment	  villages),	  and	  other	  group	  
(comparison	  group)	  originally	  planned	  to	  be	  incorporated	  during	  phase	  18	  in	  2003.	  The	  treatment	  group	  
was	   composed	   by	   320	   villages	  whose	   inhabitants	   received	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   program	   in	   September	  
1998.	  The	  control	  group	  included	  186	  villages.7	  Two	  of	  the	  poorest	  states	  were	  not	  used	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
universe	   for	   the	   randomization	   process	   for	   political	   reasons,	   Oaxaca	   and	   Chiapas.8	   Other	   states,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  the	  country	  –with	  a	  large	  historical	  tradition	  of	  migration	  –	  were	  also	  
not	   included.	   Experimental	   villages	  were	  mainly	   located	   in	   the	   central	   part	   of	   the	   country,	  which	   are	  
certainly	  different	  than	  the	  entire	  distribution.	  
The	   original	   plan	   to	   evaluate	   the	   program	   using	   the	   experiment	   changed	   in	   2000.	   Political	   pressures	  
derived	  from	  the	  federal	  election	  of	  2000	  forced	  authorities	  to	  incorporate	  the	  control	  group	  in	  January	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  randomization	  process	  included	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  corresponds	  to	  the	  poverty	  levels	  and	  the	  second	  to	  the	  
total	  population.	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  randomization	  process	  see	  Berman	  (1999)	  	  
8	  In	  both	  cases,	  there	  was	  a	  risk	  of	  contamination	  of	  the	  field	  experiment:	  the	  governor	  of	  Oaxaca	  was	  hostile	  
towards	  any	  program	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  wanted	  to	  control	  the	  assignment	  of	  the	  beneficiaries.	  In	  
the	  second	  case,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  “Zapatista”	  rebellion	  forced	  authorities	  to	  avoid	  its	  inclusion	  given	  the	  
political	  risk	  of	  doing	  so.	  Interview	  with	  Daniel	  Hernandez,	  former	  Director	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  Program.	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of	  2000.9	  This	   significantly	   reduced	   the	   time	   frame	  and	   the	  estimation	  of	   the	   long	   term	  effects	  of	   the	  
program.	  In	  addition,	  the	  lack	  of	  national	  representativeness	  of	  the	  experiment	  –it	  only	  included	  7	  out	  of	  
32	  states	  in	  the	  country-­‐	  makes	  not	  possible	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  on	  migration	  and	  labor	  
decisions	   for	   regions	   with	   different	   characteristics.	   The	   levels	   of	   information	   about	   the	   conditions	   in	  
other	  labor	  markets	  (national	  and	  international)	  vary	  significantly	  from	  one	  region	  to	  other.	  The	  sample	  
included	   in	   the	   experiment	   does	   not	   capture	   this	   regional	   variation.	   Finally,	   as	   described	   by	   Fernald,	  
Gertler	  and	  Neufeld	  (2009)	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  attrition	  of	  the	  original	  sample	  of	  households	  included	  
in	  the	  program	  for	  the	  last	  round	  of	  interviews,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  2004.	  	  
The	   original	   experiment	   had	   a	   great	   impact	   on	   applied	   economic	   literature.	   However,	   the	   lack	   of	  
national	  and	  regional	  representatives	  does	  not	  allow	  estimating	  marginal	  effects	  of	  the	  program	  in	  those	  
households	  that	  are	  located	  in	  the	  marginal	  distribution	  of	  the	  program,	  particularly	  in	  those	  states	  with	  
long	   tradition	   of	  migration.	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   use	   alternative	   identification	   strategies	   to	   analyze	   long	  
term	  effects	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
The	  literature	  on	  the	  long	  term	  effects	  of	  CCT	  is	  limited	  and	  not	  conclusive.	  The	  main	  contribution	  of	  this	  
paper	  is	  to	  propose	  this	  discontinuity	  in	  the	  expansion	  as	  the	  instrument	  to	  identify	  those	  effects.	  This	  
could	  provide	  a	  better	  estimation	  of	  the	  program,	  particularly	  on	  labor	  decisions	  and	  migration.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  documentation	  on	  this	  regard,	  several	  interviews	  with	  Santiago	  Levy,	  former	  Vice-­‐Ministry	  of	  
the	  Treasury	  and	  Daniel	  Hernandez,	  former	  Director	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades,	  reveal	  in	  this	  matter.	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4.2	  Estimation	  of	  Migration	  
The	   first	   step	   for	  estimating	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  program	   is	   to	  homologate	   the	   information	  cointained	   in	  
the	   censuses	   to	   estimate	   the	   level	   of	  migration	   in	   the	   villages	   every	   5	   years.	   To	   this	  we	   need	   to	   firs	  
determine	  the	  sources	  of	  changes	   in	   the	  population.	  Following	  Guillot,	  Heuveline	  and	  Preston,	   (2001),	  
the	  flows	  that	  determine	  the	  stock	  of	  a	  population	  from	  one	  period	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows.	  
titititititi EIDCPP ,,,,1,, −+−+= − 	   	   	   	   (7)	  
Where	  	  
• tiP , 	  is	  the	  total	  population	  in	  village	  i	  who	  were	  born	  before	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  program	  
in	  future	  periods	  (2000	  or	  2005)	  
• 1, −tiP 	   is	   the	   total	   population	   in	   village	   i	   who	   were	   born	   before	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
program	  in	  the	  baseline	  period	  (1995)	  
• tiC , 	   represents	   the	   total	  population	   in	  born	   in	  village	   i,	  who	  were	  born	  between	   the	  baseline	  
period	  (1995)	  and	  the	  next	  periods	  (2000	  and	  2005)	  
• tiD , 	   represents	   the	   total	   population	  who	  died	   in	   village	   i	   between	   the	  baseline	  period	   (1995)	  
and	  the	  next	  periods	  (2000	  and	  2005)	  
• tiI , 	   represents	   the	   total	   population	  who	   immigrates	   to	   village	   i	   between	   the	   baseline	   period	  
(1995)	  and	  the	  next	  periods	  (2000	  and	  2005)	  
• tiE , 	  represents	  the	  total	  population	  who	  emigrates	  from	  village	  to	  other	  location,	  between	  the	  
baseline	  period	  (1995)	  and	  the	  next	  periods	  (2000	  and	  2005)	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The	   information	   included	   in	   the	   censuses	   does	   not	   permit	   to	   compare	   immigration	   and	   emigration	  
during	  all	  periods.	  In	  general,	  these	  villages	  no	  not	  receive	  more	  population,	  so	  the	  emigration	  is	  higher	  
than	   the	   immigration.	   So,	   the	   last	   two	   terms	   are	   collapsed	   to	   one	   term	   (M).	   This	   could	   bias	   the	  
estimation;	  however,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  bias	  would	  attenuate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  on	  migration.	  
So,	  equitation	  (7)	  becomes.	  	  
tititititi MDCPP ,,,1,, −−+= − 	   	   	   	   (7’)	  
The	  resulting	  population	  can	  be	  divided	  between	  males	  and	  females.	  This	  allow	  us	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  
change	  in	  the	  population	  the	  same	  for	  both	  genders,	  or	  if	  one	  increases	  or	  decreases	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
other.	  The	  first	  two	  variables	  are	  reported	  in	  every	  Census	  included	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  third	  element	  can	  
be	  estimated	  using	  the	  death	  rates	  used	  in	  official	  tables	  reported	  by	  the	  Mexican	  Population	  Council.	  
So,	  the	  only	  source	  of	  variation	  is	  the	  flows	  of	  migrants	  from	  every	  village.	  	  
4.3	  Difference	  in	  difference	  (DID)	  
Every	  ex-­‐post	  period	  (2000	  and	  2005)	  makes	  feasible	  to	  use	  a	  difference	  in	  difference	  (DID)	  estimation	  
where	   each	   observation	  measures	   the	   change	   in	   the	   variables	   between	   the	   baseline	   and	   the	   ex-­‐post	  
period.	  This	  means	  that	  I	  use	  an	  indicator	  variable	  if	  the	  village	  is	  included	  in	  the	  program.	  
tittti CP ,, εβφα +++= 	   	   	   	   (8)	  
Where:	  
• tiP , Total	  population	  in	  village	  i	  in	  period	  t	  
• α 	  	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  fixed	  characteristics	  of	  the	  village	  
• φ 	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  variable	  characteristics	  of	  the	  village	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• C	  is	  the	  variable	  that	  describes	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  of	  eligible	  village	  j	  in	  time	  t=	  2000,	  
2005	  according	  to	  the	  original	  plan	  designed	  using	  1995	  
• ε	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  unobservable	  characteristics	  
This	  equation	  allows	  us	  to	  express	  the	  pre-­‐program	  period	  (1995)	  as	  follows:	  
1995,1995, itiP εφα ++= 	  	   	   	   	   (9)	  
for	  the	  post	  program	  period,	  t=	  2000	  or	  2005,	  we	  have:	  
tittti CP ,, εβφα +++= 	   	   	   	   (10)	  
The	  difference	  in	  differences	  (DD)	  model	  is	  given	  by:	  
)()( 1995,,19951995,, itittiti CPP εεβφφ −++−=− 	   	   (11)	  
This	  equation	  indicates	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  population	  living	  in	  the	  village	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  the	  variable	  
characteristics	  and	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
4.4	  Sharp	  Regression	  Discontinuity	  Design	  (RDD)	  
The	  rural	  expansion	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   finished	  in	  2003	  and	   included	  only	  villages	  classified	   in	  
the	  middle,	  high	  and	  very	  high	  marginalization	  of	  Index	  1995.	  This	  means	  that	  en	  there	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  
discontinuity	  in	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  at	  the	  cutoff	  of	  eligibility.	  	  
The	   analysis	   begins	   by	   examining	   graphically	   the	   discontinuity	   of	   the	   treatment	   and	   the	   outcome	  
variables	  used	  to	  see	   if	   there	   is	  a	  change	   in	   the	  migration	  of	   the	  villages.	  Similar	   to	  Bruhn	   (2007),	   the	  
marginalization	  index	  is	  constrained	  to	  a	  small	  interval	  (-­‐1.7	  to	  -­‐0.5,	  which	  includes	  those	  villages	  point	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wide)	   starting	   from	   the	   cutoff	   and	  going	   in	  both	  directions.	   It	   takes	   the	  non-­‐weighted	  average	  of	   the	  
outcome	  variables	  within	  each	  of	  these	  small	  intervals.	  
Figure	  1	  shows	  local	  averages	  and	  the	  estimated	  polynomials	  against	  the	  marginalization	  index	  around	  
the	  cutoff	  point	  between	  poor	  and	  non-­‐poor	  villages.	  The	  first	  figure	  shows	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  
in	  2000	  according	  to	  the	  Index	  of	  1995.	  The	  second	  shows	  the	  coverage	  in	  2005	  and	  the	  same	  index	  of	  
1995.	  In	  both	  cases,	  it	  is	  clear	  to	  see	  a	  discontinuity	  in	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  from	  those	  villages	  
with	  low	  levels	  of	  poverty	  to	  those	  located	  in	  the	  middle.	  
Using	   the	  previous	   set	   of	   equations,	  we	   can	   rewrite	   equations	   9	   and	  10	   to	   estimate	   a	  parametric	  RD	  






ti DP ,, εβφα +++= 	   	   	   	   (12)	  











ti DPP εεβφφ −++−=− 	   	   (13)	  
where	  D	  is	  the	  indicator	  variable	  of	  the	  program	  of	  eligible	  village	  j	  in	  time	  t=	  2000,	  2005.	  ε	  is	  an	  error	  
term	   (see	   Hahn	   et	   al.,	   2001,	   and	   Van	   der	   Klaauw,	   2002).	   In	   this	   equation,	   the	   cutoff	   value	   of	   the	  
marginalization	   index	   1995	   was	   covered	   by	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades,	   while	   municipalities	   below	   the	  
cutoff	  point	  were	  not	  covered.	  The	  marginalization	  index	  varies	  within	  the	  intervals	  of	  coverage	  and	  it	  is	  
correlated	   with	   the	   outcome,	   so	   it	   is	   included	   in	   the	   estimation.	   The	   local	   continuity	   assumption	  
required	  for	  using	  the	  index	  is	  satisfied	  as	  it	  is	  explained	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section.	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4.5	  Fuzzy	  Regression	  Discontinuity	  Design	  (RDD)	  
The	   last	   estimation	   takes	   into	   account	   that	   coverage	   for	   eligible	   villages	  was	   not	   complete	   and	   some	  
non-­‐eligible	  villages	  included	  households	  in	  the	  program.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  marginalization	  index	  1995	  
has	  not	  sharp	  RD	  design.	  To	  take	  into	  account	  these	  differences,	  a	  fuzzy	  RD	  design	  is	  included.	  It	  is	  based	  
on	  a	  two-­‐stage	  least	  squares,	  using	  the	  index	  as	  instrument	  for	  the	  coverage.	  The	  parametric	  analysis	  in	  
this	  paper	  uses	  only	  villages	  that	  lie	  the	  interval	  around	  the	  cutoff	  corresponding	  to	  the	  interval	  (-­‐1.7,	  -­‐
0.5)	  of	  Index	  of	  1995.	  This	  interval	  includes	  17,113	  villages.	  The	  local	  continuity	  assumption	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
satisfied	  in	  small	  intervals	  around	  the	  cutoff	  since	  the	  villages	  are	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  marginalization	  
index	  of	  1995.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  other	  intervals	  were	  included	  to	  show	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  
program.	  	  
4.6	  Validity	  of	  the	  Local	  Continuity	  Assumption	  
The	  validity	  of	  the	  RD	  technique	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  local	  continuity	  of	  the	  independent	  
variable.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   villages	   around	   the	   cutoff	   must	   be	   similar.	   This	   assumption	   is	   highly	  
difficult	  to	  test.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  number	  of	  villages	  in	  the	  distribution	  makes	  feasible	  to	  compare	  pre-­‐
program	  outcome	  variables	  like	  population	  and	  gender	  composition.	  A	  similar	  distribution	  of	  these	  pre-­‐
program	   characteristics	   makes	   credible	   the	   assumption	   of	   using	   the	   low	   coverage	   villages	   as	   a	   valid	  
counterfactual.	  	  
The	  use	  of	  RD	  design	  can	  be	  invalidated	  if	  the	  assignment	  variable	  is	  manipulated	  by	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  
the	   cutoff	   that	   determines	   eligibility	   to	   Progresa	   could	   have	   been	   set	   to	   include	   villages	   that	   are	  
significantly	  different	  around	  this	  value.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  possible	  since	  this	  index	  was	  determined	  by	  
CONAPO,	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Progresa.	  Second,	  any	  manipulation	  of	  the	  index	  could	  violate	  local	  
continuity	  assumption	  since	  it	  results	  from	  a	  sorting	  process	  around	  the	  cutoff.	  Similar	  to	  the	  previous	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point,	  the	  sorting	  process	  was	  not	  possible	  since	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  index	  depended	  on	  variables	  of	  
the	  1995	  census.	  In	  that	  year	  Progresa	  was	  not	  even	  designed.	  Moreover,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  villages	  
could	  manipulate	  their	  Census	  data.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  could	  
produce	   discontinuities	   in	   pre-­‐program	   characteristics	   around	   the	   cutoff.	   However,	   the	   value	   of	   the	  
observed	  characteristics	  included	  in	  the	  census	  is	  continuous	  as	  shown	  in	  Figures	  2,	  where	  there	  are	  no	  
significant	   differences	   by	   population	   size	   and	   gender	   composition.	   In	   sum,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	  
invalidate	  the	  use	  of	  RDD	  as	  a	  proper	  identification	  strategy.	  	  
Data	  and	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
This	   paper	   is	   based	   on	   three	   sets	   of	   data:	   census	   data	   from	   the	  Mexican	   Census	   Bureau	   (INEGI)	   that	  
includes	  information	  on	  population,	  households	  and	  dwellings	  characteristics;	  poverty	  indexes	  from	  the	  
Mexican	   Population	   Council	   (CONAPO);	   and	   the	   roll	   out	   information	   of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   from	  
the	  administrative	  records	  provided	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Development	  and	  National	  Office	  for	  the	  
Administration	  of	  Oportunidades.	  All	  data	  is	  reported	  at	  village	  level,	  the	  basic	  geographic	  unit	  used	  by	  
the	  Mexican	  Census	  Board,	  which	  has	  a	  unique	  identifier	  that	  allows	  comparison	  every	  single	  village	  in	  
the	  country	  across	  time.10	  	  
Variables	  are	  reported	  every	  five	  years–the	  period	  between	  partial	  and	  complete	  censuses-­‐	  from	  1990	  
to	  2005.	  The	  number	  of	  variables	  collected	  by	  INEGI	  at	  village	  level	  has	  increased	  over	  time.	  So,	  it	  is	  not	  
possible	  to	  collect	  the	  exact	  same	  variables	  for	  the	  four	  periods,	  except	  for	  the	  basic	  information.	  1990	  
and	  1995	  are	  taken	  as	  pre-­‐program	  periods	  given	  that	  the	  program	  started	  its	  expansion	  in	  1997.	  	  
Census	  data	  is	  used	  by	  the	  Mexican	  Population	  Council	  for	  estimating	  a	  poverty	  index	  every	  five	  years.	  
The	  indexes	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  marginalization	  of	  every	  village	  based	  on	  nine	  variables	  that	  describe	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Each	  village	  id	  has	  nine	  digits:	  2	  for	  the	  state,	  3	  for	  the	  municipio	  and	  4	  for	  the	  village.	  Concatenating	  all	  digits	  
makes	  the	  id	  unique.	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level	   of	   education,	   quality	   of	   housing	   and	   public	   services,	   urbanization	   and	   income	  of	   the	   population	  
living	   in	   two	   categories	  of	   villages,	   urban	  and	   rural.11	   The	  distribution	  of	   the	   index	  CONAPO	  classified	  
municipalities	   into	  five	   levels	  of	  poverty	  -­‐	  very	   low,	   low,	  medium-­‐range,	  high,	  and	  very	  high,	  using	  the	  
Dalenius	  and	  Hodges	  stratification	  method	  (Dalenius	  and	  Hodges,	  1959).	  A	  complete	  description	  of	  the	  
components,	  their	  weight	  in	  the	  index	  and	  the	  cutoff	  values	  are	  included	  in	  Tables	  B,	  C	  and	  D	  of	  the	  Data	  
Appendix.	  
Information	  on	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  historical	  census	  of	  beneficiaries	  provided	  
by	   the	  Mexican	  Ministry	   of	   Social	   Development	   (Secretaría	   de	   Desarrollo	   Social	   –SEDESOL-­‐)	   and	   the	  
National	  Office	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  Oportunidades.	  The	  records	  are	  reported	  at	  the	  end	  of	  every	  
phase	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  year.	  The	  last	  large	  expansion	  finished	  in	  2003.	  From	  that	  year	  up	  now	  the	  
number	  of	  beneficiaries	   in	   rural	  areas	  has	   remained	  almost	   identical.	  Changes	  come	   from	  households	  
that	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  program	  only.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  Data	  Annex,	  the	  estimated	  
coverage	  reflects	  the	  effective	  number	  of	  households	  included	  in	  the	  program	  according	  to	  the	  rollout	  
calendar	  at	  the	  end	  of	  every	  ex-­‐post	  period.	  	  
The	  set	  of	  villages	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  are	  those	  classified	  as	  rural	  in	  the	  partial	  census	  of	  1995.	  The	  
total	  number	  of	  villages	  in	  1995	  was	  50,666.	  INEGI	  uses	  a	  population	  threshold	  living	  in	  the	  village	  equal	  
to	  2,500	   inhabitants	   to	  classify	   rural	   villages.	  Table	  1	  gives	   summary	   statistics.	   It	   contains	  data	  on	   the	  
size	  of	  the	  total	  population	  from	  1990	  to	  2005;	  the	  population	  between	  0	  and	  5	  years	  old	  –children-­‐;	  the	  
generation	   of	   the	   population	   born	   before	   the	   implementation	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades;	   the	   male	  
ratio	  of	  this	  population	  (as	  the	   indicator	  of	  migration);	   total	  deaths;	  total	  households;	  poverty	   indexes	  
and	  coverage	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  index	  is	  estimated	  using	  a	  principal	  components	  method	  and	  has	  changed	  its	  estimation	  over	  time.	  To	  see	  
the	  details	  of	  its	  estimation	  see	  http://www.conapo.gob.mx/index.php	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As	   shown	   in	   the	   table,	   the	   average	   population	   size	   of	   the	   villages	   increased	   between	   1990-­‐1995	   and	  
1995-­‐2000,	   with	   a	   lower	   growth	   rate	   during	   the	   last	   period.	   From	   2000	   to	   2005	   there	   is	   a	   negative	  
growth,	   which	   reduced	   the	   average	   size	   to	   similar	   levels	   of	   1995	   –around	   390	   inhabitants-­‐.	   The	  
population	   born	   before	   the	   implementation	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   permanently	   decreased	   from	  
1990	   to	  2005,	  going	   from	  393	   to	  300	  during	   this	  period.	  The	  average	  number	  of	   children	  –population	  
under	  5	   years	  old-­‐	   increased	   from	  1995	   to	  2000	   (from	  51.8	   to	  54.7),	   but	   significantly	  decreased	   from	  
2000	  to	  2005	  (45.5	  on	  average).	  This	  last	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  different	  reasons,	  particularly,	  the	  increase	  
in	  migration	   (less	   adults	   having	   children)	   and	   less	   children	   of	   those	   staying	   at	   the	   village	   because	   of	  
better	  provision	  of	  family	  planning	  services	  included	  in	  the	  program.	  
The	  data	  also	  shows	  a	  permanent	  reduction	  of	  the	  ratio	  males/females.	  It	  decreased	  from	  1.03	  in	  1995	  
to	   1.00	   and	   to	   0.95	   in	   2000	   and	   2005,	   respectively.	   This	   indicates	   a	   higher	   reduction	   of	   the	   male	  
population	   living	   in	   those	   villages	   during	   this	   period.	   As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   only	  
possible	  source	  of	  this	  reduction	  is	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  male	  migration,	  since	  there	  are	  no	  reported	  changes	  
in	  differences	  of	  death	  rates.	  The	  number	  of	  deaths	  remained	  the	  same	  on	  average	  during	  the	  period	  –
around	  8	  people,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  households	  increased	  from	  76	  to	  88.	  These	  two	  facts	  also	  indicate	  
changes	   in	   migration	   patterns:	   the	   number	   of	   households	   increased	   over	   time,	   number	   of	   deaths	  
remained	  constant	  and	  a	  significant	  reduction	  of	  the	  male	  population.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   average	   coverage	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   increased	   from	   zero	   in	   1995	   (pre-­‐program	  
period)	  to	  0.34	  in	  2000	  and	  0.63	  in	  2005.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  coincidence	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  program	  with	  
the	   increase	  of	  migration	   in	   these	  villages.	   The	  empirical	   strategy	  described	   in	   the	  previous	   section	   is	  
now	  used	  to	  disentangle	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  in	  the	  increase	  of	  migration.	  	  




This	   section	   provides	   the	   estimations	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   expansion	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   on	  
migration	  and	  gender	  composition	   in	  rural	  areas.	  There	  are	  three	  main	  estimations:	  OLS	  for	  the	  entire	  
set	  of	  villages	  covered	  by	  the	  program;	  RD	  for	  the	  villages	  around	  the	  cutoff	  point	  of	  the	  program;	  and	  
RD	  with	  two	  stage	  least	  squares,	  where	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  is	  instrumented	  using	  the	  original	  
marginalization	  index.	  These	  three	  estimations	  are	  used	  for	  the	  short	  run	  period	  (1997-­‐2000)	  and	  other	  
three	  estimations	  for	  the	  long	  run	  (1997-­‐2005).	  Table	  2	  and	  Table	  3	  show	  the	  estimations	  of	  the	  effect	  
of	  the	  program	  on	  migration	  and	  gender	  composition,	  respectively.	  Table	  4	  includes	  different	  calipers	  to	  
show	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  estimations.	  	  
Columns	  1	  and	  4	  of	  Table	  2	  show	  the	  OLS	  estimation	   for	   the	  short	   run	  and	   long	  run.	   In	   the	   first	  case,	  
there	  is	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  the	  coverage	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  reducing	  the	  population	  size	  
by	  increasing	  migration.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  period	  1997-­‐2000	  is	  14	  percentage	  points	  and	  29	  percentage	  
points	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2005.	  Both	  estimations	  are	  significant	  at	  1	  percent	  level	  with	  robust	  standard	  
errors	  clustered	  by	  municipio	  and	  include	  47,918	  and	  47,085	  villages	  in	  2,295	  municipios,	  respectively.	  12	  
The	  regressions	  also	  include	  fixed	  effects	  by	  municipio–to	  eliminate	  constant	  unobserved	  characteristics	  
at	   this	   geographic	   level-­‐.	   Two	   additional	   controls	   -­‐total	   population	   in	   1990	   and	   the	   poverty	   index	   in	  
1995-­‐	   were	   included	   to	   control	   for	   unobserved	   heterogeneity	   that	   could	   affect	   population	   trends.	  
However,the	   estimations	   are	   robust	  when	   both	   controls	   are	   not	   included.	   13	   These	   results	  mean	   that	  
fully	  covered	  village	  in	  2000	  decreased	  the	  size	  of	  its	  population	  born	  before	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
program	   by	   almost	   15	   percentage	   points,	   while	   for	   the	   long	   run	   (2005)	   it	   decreased	   by	   almost	   30	  
percentage	  points.	  These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  model	  described	  in	  Section	  II.	  The	  increase	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  lack	  of	  some	  information	  for	  some	  variables	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  drop	  in	  the	  number	  of	  observations.	  In	  
fact,	  some	  villages	  completely	  disappear	  between	  1995,	  2000	  and	  2005.	  	  
 
13	  The	  estimations	  without	  these	  controls	  are	  not	  reported,	  but	  can	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  author.	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the	   resources	   increased	   general	   migration	   in	   a	   very	   small	   scale	   in	   the	   short	   run,	   but	   as	   individuals	  
increase	  their	  human	  capital,	  the	  level	  of	  migration	  is	  higher.	  	  
Columns	  2	  and	  5	  contain	  the	  estimation	  using	  the	  reduced	  form	  of	  the	  results	  using	  the	  RD	  around	  the	  
cutoff	  point	  of	  eligibility.	  Similar	   to	   the	  previous	  estimation,	   the	   first	   regression	  shows	  estimations	   for	  
the	   period	   1997-­‐2000	   and	   the	   second	   for	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2005.	   It	   contains	   the	   same	   controls,	  
municipality	   fixed	   effects	   and	   robust	   clustered	   standard	   errors.	   These	   samples	   include	   17,113	   and	  
16,891	  villages	  for	  each	  case.14	  The	  magnitude	  in	  this	  case	  is	  lower	  than	  for	  all	  the	  population:	  the	  effect	  
of	   coverage	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   on	   the	   total	   change	   of	   population	   born	   before	   the	  
implementation	   of	   the	   program	   is	   5	   percentage	   points	   and	   11	   percentage	   points,	   for	   short	   and	   long	  
terms	   respectively.	  Both	   results	  are	   significant	  at	  1	  percent	   level.	   These	   results	  mean	   that	   for	   villages	  
with	  very	  similar	  characteristics,	  the	  effect	  of	  having	  a	  fully	  covered	  village	  decreased	  the	  double	  in	  the	  
long	  run.	  	  
Finally,	  columns	  3	  and	  6	  display	  the	  instrumental	  variables	  results,	  where	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program	  is	  
being	   instrumented	   using	   the	   poverty	   index	   of	   1995.	   The	   effect	   of	   the	   coverage	   on	  migration	   in	   the	  
short	   run	   7.6	   percentage	   points,	   while	   for	   the	   long	   run,	   the	   effect	   is	   9.7	   percentage	   points.	   Both	  
estimations	   are	   significant	   at	   1	   percent	   and	   have	   the	   same	   controls,	   fixed	   effects	   by	   municipio	   and	  
robust	  and	  clustered	  standard	  errors.	  	  
Results	   in	   Table	   2	   indicate	   that	   the	   program	   increase	   migration	   in	   both,	   short	   and	   long,	   terms.	   The	  
magnitude	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  significantly	  higher	  for	  smaller	  and	  poorer	  villages,	  but	  it	  is	  smaller	  for	  villages	  
similar	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  RD.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  villages	  have	  incomplete	  information	  in	  2005.	  This	  could	  affect	  the	  estimation,	  
since	  it	  could	  be	  assumed	  that	  complete	  villages	  disappeared	  or	  100	  percent	  migration.	  I	  decided	  not	  to	  impute	  




We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  on	  the	  gender	  composition	  of	  the	  villages	  described	  in	  Table	  
3.	  This	  table	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Table	  2:	  columns	  in	  the	  upper	  part	  describe	  the	  short-­‐term	  
effect	   (1997-­‐2000),	   and	   the	   bottom	   part	   long	   term	   (1997-­‐2005).	   The	   first	   set	   of	   columns	   show	   OLS	  
estimations;	  the	  second	  the	  reduced	  forms;	  and,	  the	  third	  shows	  the	  instrumental	  variables	  results.	  All	  
of	   them	   include	   fixed	   effects	   by	  municipio	   and	   the	   additional	   controls.	   They	   include	   robust	   standard	  
errors	  clustered	  by	  municipio.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  OLS,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  magnitude	  is	  close	  to	  zero	  and	  not	  significant	  for	  the	  short	  run,	  
while	  for	  the	  long	  run	  is	  almost	  two	  percentage	  points	  for	  the	  long	  run.	  The	  estimation	  is	  significant	  at	  1	  
percent	  level.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  constant	  is	  also	  significant	  at	  1	  percent	  level	  with	  negative	  values	  of	  1.8	  
and	   4.65	   respectively.	   This	  means	   that	   both	   periods	   there	   is	   a	   reduction	   of	   total	  males	   compared	   to	  
females,	  but	  this	  difference	   is	  almost	   forty	  percent	  higher	   in	  the	   long	  run	  for	  a	   fully	  covered	  village	  (a	  
not	  covered	  village	  reduced	  its	  male	  population	  by	  4.6	  percentage	  points,	  while	  a	  fully	  covered	  reduced	  
it	  by	  6.4	  percentage	  points.	  	  
The	   estimation	   for	   the	   reduced	   form	   is	   very	   similar.	   The	  magnitude	   of	   the	   short	   run	   is	   1.0	   negative	  
percentage	   points,	   but	   insignificant.	   For	   the	   long	   run	   is	   1.4	   negative	   percentage	   points.	   Similarly,	   the	  
value	   of	   the	   constant	   is	   negative	   for	   the	   estimations,	   2.0	   and	   4.6	   negative	   percentage	   points,	  
respectively.	  	  
Finally,	   for	   the	   instrumental	   variable	   results	   the	   effect	   is	   significantly	   higher	   in	   both	   periods.	   The	  
coefficients	  are	  7.4	  and	  2.4	  negative	  percentage	  points.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  males	  migrated	  more	  than	  
females	  in	  a	  fully	  covered	  village.	  	  
Overall,	   the	   estimations	   suggest	   a	   causal	   effect	   of	   the	   expansion	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   on	  
migration.	  The	  long	  term	  effects	  are	  significant	  for	  both	  variables	  used	  for	  the	  estimations,	  population	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born	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  and	  the	  male/female	  ratio.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  reduction	  
of	  population	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  higher	  for	  males.	  This	  suggests	  an	  acceleration	  of	  the	  migration	  from	  
rural	  villages	  to	  other	  locations.	  	  
	  




Conditional	   cash	   transfer	   (CCT)	  programs	  have	  been	  widely	  expanded	  over	   the	   last	  decade	  across	   the	  
world.	   The	   large	   scale	   field	   experiment	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   showed	   scientific	   evidence	   on	  
reducing	  poverty,	  increasing	  levels	  of	  health,	  nutrition	  and	  education	  and	  made	  them	  very	  attractive	  to	  
national	   governments.	   Today	   more	   than	   twenty	   countries	   have	   initiated	   efforts	   to	   expand	   CCT	   and	  
increase	   human	   capital	   levels	   of	   the	   poorest	   populations.	   However,	   there	   are	   some	   open	   questions	  
about	   the	   long	   term	   effects	   of	   these	   programs,	   particularly	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   and	   the	   experimental	  
evidence	  is	  limited	  on	  this	  regard.	  
New	   generations	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	   health	   and	   education	   are	   more	   productive	   and	   would	   have	  
incentives	   to	   find	  different	  occupations	   in	  other	   labor	  markets.	   This	   effect	   is	   not	   the	   same	   for	   all	   the	  
population	   covered	   by	   a	   CCT	   program.	   As	   suggested	   by	   theory,	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   program	   should	   be	  
higher	   for	   those	   individuals	   considered	   relatively	   less	   poor	   of	   the	   population.	   Young	   healthier	   and	  
marginally	  more	  educated	   individuals	  would	  decide	   to	  abandon	   their	   communities	  and	   find	  a	   job	   in	  a	  
different	  market.	  This	  paper	  shows	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  
There	   is	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   on	   increasing	   rural	   migration.	   The	   estimation	  
uses	  data	  from	  the	  Mexican	  Censuses	  1990,	  1995,	  2000	  and	  2005,	  the	  poverty	  index	  used	  to	  determine	  
the	  eligibility	  to	  the	  program	  and	  the	  administrative	  records	  of	  the	  rollout	  of	  the	  program.	  As	  a	  first	  step,	  
the	  initial	  set	  of	  villages	  eligible	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  program	  was	  replicated	  according	  to	  the	  poverty	  
index	   from	   the	   1995	   census	   –pre-­‐program	   period-­‐.	   This	   included	   50,666	   villages	   classified	   as	   rural	   (a	  
population	  threshold	  of	  2,500	  inhabitants).	  	  
The	  sample	  size	  allowed	  several	  estimations	  of	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  expansion	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  
on	  migration.	   It	   included	  OLS	  estimates	   for	   the	  entire	  dataset	  and	  a	  RD	  –sharp	  and	   fuzzy-­‐	  around	   the	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eligibility	  criteria	  used	  to	  classify	  villages	  in	  the	  original	  rollout	  plan	  of	  the	  program.	  Migration	  rate	  of	  the	  
population	  born	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  increased	  more	  in	  those	  villages	  covered	  by	  the	  
program,	   for	   both	   short	   (1997-­‐2000)	   and	   long	   term	   (1997-­‐2005).	   OLS	   and	   RD	   estimation	   shows	   that	  
migration	   increased	   between	   14	   and	   5	   percentage	   points	   for	   the	   first	   case	   and	   between	   29	   and	   10	  
percentage	  points	  in	  the	  second	  period.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  gender	  composition	  for	  the	  same	  cohorts,	  we	  
find	   no	   significant	   differences	   for	   the	   first	   period,	   and	   significant	   reduction	   of	   males	   for	   the	   second	  
period.	  Both	  estimations	  suggest	  a	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  over	  time.	  	  	  
This	  evidence	  supports	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  would	  be	  accelerating	  migration	  
patterns	  of	  marginal	  individuals	  who	  once	  increase	  their	  human	  capital	  levels.	  They	  decide	  to	  leave	  their	  
villages	   and	   go	   to	   another	   location.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   poor	   population	   is	   leaving	   their	  
communities,	  but	  only	  those	  who	  once	  the	  program	  has	  increased	  their	  marginal	  productivity	  will	  decide	  
to	   leave.	   These	   findings	   contribute	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   CCT	   program	   labor	  mobility,	   a	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− Every	  dot	  represented	  a	  village	  included	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  rollout	  plan	  of	  the	  program.	  It	  only	  includes	  rural	  villages	  (less	  than	  2500	  
inhabitants	  in	  1995	  
− Those	  villages	  located	  to	  the	  left	  of	  Marginalization	  Index	  are	  considered	  less	  poor	  (frequency	  of	  the	  poverty	  variables	  is	  lower),	  while	  those	  
to	  the	  right	  are	  poorer.	  This	  explains	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  program.	  	  	  
− The	  solid	  line	  is	  the	  local	  polynomial	  of	  degree	  2	  of	  a	  Kernel	  function.	  It	  provides	  the	  estimated	  coverage	  of	  the	  population	  living	  in	  the	  
villages	  included	  in	  the	  program.	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Poverty Index 1995
Source:  Author's estimation using Poverty Index 1995
This index was used for designing the original coverage of the program
Short Run Difference 1995 - 2000
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Poverty Index 1995
Source:  Author's estimation using Poverty Index 1995
This index was used for designing the original coverage of the program
Long Run Difference 1995 - 2005




Pre-­‐Program	  Characteristics	  for	  the	  RDD	  sample	  
	  
	  
Notes:	  The	  solid	  line	  is	  the	  local	  polynomial	  of	  degree	  2	  using	  a	  kernel	  function.	  It	  provides	  the	  estimated	  population	  and	  the	  
ratio	  males/females	  in	  1995	  (pre-­‐program	  period)	  of	  villages	  included	  in	  the	  program.	  	  
	  
























Source:  Author's estimation using Poverty Index 1995 and census data
This index was used for designing the original coverage of the program
Pre-Program 1995


















Source:  Author's estimation using Poverty Index 1995 and census data
This index was used for designing the original coverage of the program
Pre-Program 1995





Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
Population	  1990/1	   50666	   364.05	   440.21	   0	   23067	  
Population	  1995/1	   50666	   393.12	   435.26	   50	   2500	  
Population	  2000/1	   50666	   402.06	   474.51	   0	   12946	  
Population	  2005/1	   50666	   391.57	   509.70	   0	   19559	  
Adults	  1990/1	   50666	   364.05	   440.21	   0	   23067	  
Adults	  1995/1	   50666	   393.12	   435.26	   50	   2500	  
Adults	  2000/1	   50666	   355.45	   417.55	   1	   9678	  
Adults	  2005/1	   50666	   300.54	   391.93	   0	   12638	  
Children	  1995/1	   50666	   51.84	   58.01	   0	   465	  
Children	  2000/1	   50666	   54.76	   70.22	   0	   3291	  
Children	  2005/1	   50666	   45.45	   67.69	   0	   3861	  
Male	  ratio	  1995	   50666	   1.04	   0.25	   0.063	  	   29	  
Male	  ratio	  2000	   50666	   1.00	   0.20	   0.129	  	   19	  
Male	  ratio	  2005	   50666	   0.96	   0.24	   0.000	   17.36264	  
Dead	  1990-­‐1995/2	   50666	   8.70	   10.52	   0	   551	  
Dead	  1995-­‐2000/2	   50666	   8.15	   9.08	   1	   54	  
Dead	  2000-­‐2005/2	   50666	   8.29	   9.77	   0	   231	  
Households	  1995/1	   50666	   76.19	   86.49	   1	   643	  
Households	  2000/1	   50666	   83.37	   99.61	   0	   2621	  
Households	  2005/1	   50666	   88.59	   115.76	   0	   4314	  
Coverage	  Progresa	  1995/3	   50666	   0.00	   0.00	   0	   0	  
Coverage	  Progresa	  2000/3	   49428	   0.34	   0.26	   0	   1	  
Coverage	  Progresa	  2005/3	   48402	   0.64	   0.31	   0	   1	  
Poverty	  index	  1995/4	   50666	   -­‐0.28	   0.74	   -­‐1.99915	   0.999972	  
Poverty	  index	  2000/4	   49428	   -­‐0.34	   0.69	   -­‐2.8852	   2.750869	  
Poverty	  index	  2005/4	   48402	   -­‐0.38	   0.65	   -­‐2.00348	   2.621933	  
Sources:	   	   	   	   	   	  
1/	  INEGI:	  Mexican	  National	  Board	  of	  Statistics.	  Censuses	  1990,	  2000	  and	  2010.	  Partial	  Censuses	  1995	  and	  2005	  
2/	  Estimations	  using	  official	  death	  rates	  from	  CONAPO	  
3/	  SEDESOL.	  Mexican	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Development.	  It	  measures	  the	  total	  households	  estimated	  in	  1995	  to	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  
initial	  rollout	  plan.	  	  
Note:	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  is	  given	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  complete	  information	  for	  eligibility.	  	  
4/	  CONAPO.	  Mexican	  Population	  Council.	  This	  is	  the	  office	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  poverty	  index	  based	  on	  the	  results	  
of	  the	  censuses	  and	  partial	  censuses.	  The	  index	  1995	  was	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  eligibility	  to	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  and	  to	  
determine	  the	  rollout	  plan.	  	  




Effect	  of	  Rollout	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  Migration	  (1995-­‐2000-­‐2005)	  	  
Short	  Run:	  
	  1995	  -­‐	  2000	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
OLS	   RDD	   RDD.	  2SLS	  
Migration	  2000/A	  	   Migration	  2000/B	  	   Migration	  2000/C	  	  
Coverage	  2000	   -­‐0.14916***	   -­‐0.05828***	   -­‐0.07642***	  
	  
[0.010]	   [0.007]	   [0.021]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.03802***	   -­‐0.08525***	   -­‐0.09468***	  
	  
[0.004]	   [0.009]	   [0.011]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   47918	   17113	   17113	  
R-­‐squared	   0.145	   0.227	   0.034	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Long	  Run:	  
	  1995	  –	  2005	  
(4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
OLS	   RDD	   RDD.	  2SLS	  
Migration	  2005/A	  	   Migration	  2005/B	  	   Migration	  2005/C	  	  
Coverage	  2005	   -­‐0.29889***	   -­‐0.11453***	   -­‐0.09770***	  
	  
[0.016]	   [0.010]	   [0.024]	  
Constant	   0.10784***	   0.0209	   -­‐0.02118	  
	  
[0.012]	   [0.020]	   [0.031]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   47085	   16891	   16891	  
R-­‐squared	   0.202	   0.259	   0.073	  
	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
Robust	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipio	  
Notes:	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  variables	  displayed	  in	  the	  table,	  all	  regressions	  include	  two	  control	  variables:	  poverty	  index	  1995	  and	  
population	  of	  1990.	  
Coverage	  2000	  measures	  the	  total	  households	  included	  in	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  households	  
estimated	  for	  the	  rollout	  plan.	  
/A	  This	  is	  the	  change	  of	  population	  who	  born	  before	  1995	  (before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Progresa)	  after	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  
death	  population.	  
/B	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  villages	  with	  poverty	  index	  1995	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐.5.	  	  
/C	  Coverage	  is	  instrumented	  by	  the	  poverty	  index	  1995in	  the	  vicinity	  included	  in	  the	  vicinity	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐.5.	  	  	  






Effect	  of	  Rollout	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  Gender	  Composition	  of	  Villages	  
(1995-­‐2000-­‐2005)	  	  
Short	  Run:	  
	  1995	  -­‐	  2000	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
OLS	   RDD	   RDD.	  2SLS	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  /A	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  /B	  
Coverage	  2000	   -­‐0.00201	   -­‐0.01019	   -­‐0.07434**	  
	  
[0.004]	   [0.016]	   [0.032]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.01801***	   -­‐0.02092*	   -­‐0.04380***	  
	  
[0.002]	   [0.012]	   [0.008]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   47917	   7405	   7405	  
R-­‐squared	   0.08	   0.219	   0.018	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Long	  Run:	  
	  1995	  -­‐	  2005	  
(4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
OLS	   RDD	   RDD.	  2SLS	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  /A	  
Change	  Males	  Ratio	  
(Males/Females)	  /B	  
Coverage	  2005	   -­‐0.01775***	   -­‐0.01442*	   -­‐0.02428***	  
	  
[0.005]	   [0.008]	   [0.007]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.04651***	   -­‐0.05293***	   -­‐0.07639***	  
	  
[0.004]	   [0.009]	   [0.013]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   47070	   16887	   16887	  
R-­‐squared	   0.15	   0.209	   0.087	  
	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
Robust	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipio	  
Notes:	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  variables	  displayed	  in	  the	  table,	  all	  regressions	  include	  two	  control	  variables:	  
poverty	  index	  1995	  and	  population	  of	  1990.	  
Coverage	  2000	  measures	  the	  total	  households	  included	  in	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  based	  on	  the	  
number	  of	  households	  estimated	  for	  the	  rollout	  plan.	  
/A	  This	  is	  the	  change	  of	  population	  who	  born	  before	  1995	  (before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Progresa)	  
after	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  death	  population.	  
/B	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  villages	  with	  poverty	  index	  1995	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐.5.	  	  
/C	  Coverage	  is	  instrumented	  by	  the	  poverty	  index	  1995in	  the	  vicinity	  included	  in	  the	  vicinity	  
between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐.5.	  






Effect	  of	  Rollout	  of	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  on	  Migration	  (1995-­‐2000-­‐2005)	  using	  different	  Callipers	  
Short	  Run:	  
	  1995	  -­‐	  2000	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
RDD1	   RDD2	   RDD3	   RDD1.	  2SLS	   RDD2.	  2SLS	   RDD3.	  2SLS	  
Change	  Population	  
2000	  /A,	  B	  
Change	  Population	  
2000	  /A,	  B	  
Change	  Population	  
2000/A,	  B	  	  
Change	  Population	  
200/A,	  C	  0	  	  
Change	  Population	  
2000/A,	  C	  	  
Change	  Population	  
2000/A,	  C	  	  
Coverage	  2000	   -­‐0.07392**	   -­‐0.06179**	   -­‐0.12739***	   -­‐0.149222***	   -­‐0.21912**	   -­‐0.02718	  
	  
[0.034]	   [0.026]	   [0.020]	   [0.178]	   [0.087]	   [0.042]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.09729***	   -­‐0.09596***	   -­‐0.03473*	   -­‐0.0575	   -­‐0.10311***	   -­‐0.10019***	  
	  
[0.026]	   [0.031]	   [0.020]	   [0.041]	   [0.027]	   [0.026]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   7405	   5968	   12519	   7405	   5968	   12519	  
R-­‐squared	   0.327	   0.305	   0.256	   0.037	   0.034	   0.029	  
Long	  Run:	  
	  1995	  -­‐	  2005	  
(7)	   (8)	   (9)	   (10)	   (11)	   (12)	  













Coverage	  2005	   -­‐0.14112***	   -­‐0.13089***	   -­‐0.28412***	   -­‐0.11996*	   -­‐0.07283*	   -­‐0.06934	  
	  
[0.028]	   [0.026]	   [0.026]	   [0.081]	   [0.062]	   [0.066]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.12557***	   -­‐0.14047***	   0.06800***	   -­‐0.13591**	   -­‐0.16908***	   -­‐0.17487***	  
	  
[0.038]	   [0.045]	   [0.024]	   [0.062]	   [0.052]	   [0.065]	  
Muncipality	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   7318	   5897	   12331	   7318	   5897	   12331	  
R-­‐squared	   0.329	   0.394	   0.31	   0.097	   0.103	   0.043	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  Robust	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipio	  
Notes:	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  variables	  displayed	  in	  the	  table,	  all	  regressions	  include	  two	  control	  variables:	  poverty	  index	  1995	  and	  population	  of	  1990.	  
Coverage	  2000	  and	  coverage	  205	  measure	  the	  total	  households	  included	  in	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  during	  those	  years	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  households	  estimated	  for	  the	  rollout	  plan.	  
/A	  This	  is	  the	  change	  of	  population	  who	  born	  before	  1995	  (before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Progresa)	  after	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  death	  population.	  
/B	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  villages	  with	  poverty	  index	  1995.	  The	  first	  (regressions	  1	  and	  7)	  is	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐0.5.;	  the	  second	  (regressions	  2	  and	  8)	  is	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐1;	  and	  the	  third	  
(regressions	  3	  and	  9)	  is	  between	  -­‐1.5	  and	  -­‐1	  -­‐1.2	  
/C	  Coverage	  is	  instrumented	  by	  the	  poverty	  index	  1995	  using	  the	  previous	  calipers.	  .	  The	  first	  (regressions	  4	  and	  10)	  is	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐0.5.;	  the	  second	  (regressions	  5	  and	  11)	  is	  between	  -­‐1.7	  and	  -­‐1;	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  Data	  Appendix.	  
Progresa	  Oportunidades	  
Table	  A	  
Marginalization	  Index.	  Variables	  used	  for	  its	  estimation	  
School	  Level	  
Grant	  	   Grant	   Max.	  	  Food	  +	  School	  
Per	  Household	  Boys	  	   Girls	  	  
Elementary	  	  
3	   $12.00	  	  
$110	  	  
4	   $14.00	  	  
5	   $18.00	  	  
6	   $24.00	  	  
Secondary	  	  
7	   $35.00	  	   $37.00	  	  
8	   $37.00	  	   $41.00	  	  
9	   $39.00	  	   $45.00	  	  
High	  School	  	  
1	   $58.50	  	   $67.50	  	  
$185	  	  2	   $63.00	  	   $71.50	  	  
3	   $66.50	  	   $76.00	  	  
Source:	  Oportunidades,	  Rules	  of	  Operation	  2010.	  www.oportunidades.gob.mx	  
	  
	  
Marginalization	  Index	  1995.	  
	  
Table	  B	  
Components	  and	  Score	  of	  Variable	  Used	  for	  Estimating	  the	  Marginalization	  Index	  1995	  
Variable	   Score	  
Illiteracy	   0.22325	  
%	  no	  water	   0.19664	  
%	  no	  drainage	   0.20779	  
%	  no	  Electricity	   0.2176	  
Overcrowding	   0.21237	  
%	  Soil	  floor	   0.25506	  
Fraction	  in	  agriculture	   0.16382	  
Source:	  Mexican	  Population	  Council	  (CONAPO).	  
	  




Cutoff	  Values	  of	  Marginalization	  Index	  1995	  
Level	  of	  
Marginalization	  
Ranges	  of	  the	  index	  
Very	  low	   [-­‐2.56376028	  	  a	  	  -­‐1.58761244]	  
Low	   (-­‐1.58761244	  	  a	  	  -­‐1.19721803]	  
Medium	   (-­‐1.19721803	  	  a	  	  -­‐0.61144459]	  
High	   (-­‐0.61144459	  	  a	  	  	  0.03946112]	  
Very	  high	   (	  	  0.03946112	  	  a	  	  3.94443420]	  
Source:	  Mexican	  Population	  Council	  (CONAPO).	  
	  
Table	  D	  
Variables	  used	  to	  construct	  the	  Marginalization	  Index	  
Dimensions	  	   Type	  of	  exclusion	   Variable	  of	  Census	   Source	  
Education	   Illiteracy	   Fraction	  of	  the	  illiterate	  
population	  15	  years	  
and	  older	  	  
Partial	  Census	  
	  	   Elementary	  dropout	   Fraction	  of	  population	  
with	  incomplete	  
elementary	  education	  
15	  years	  and	  older	  
Census	  full	  survey	  
Dwelling	   Without	  potable	  water	   Without	  potable	  water	   Partial	  Census	  
	   Without	  drainage	   Without	  drainage	   Partial	  Census	  
	   Without	  electricity	   Fraction	  of	  dwellings	  
without	  electricity	  
Partial	  Census	  
	   With	  soil	  floor	   Fraction	  of	  dwellings	  
with	  soil	  floor	  
Census	  full	  survey	  
	   Overcrowding	   Fraction	  of	  population	  
living	  in	  overcrowded	  
dwelling	  
Census	  full	  survey	  
Dispersion	  of	  
Population	  
Rural	  population	  	   Village	  with	  less	  than	  
5000	  inhabitants	  
Partial	  Census	  
Monetary	  income	   Occupied	  population	  
earning	  less	  than	  2	  
minimum	  wages	  
Occupied	  population	  
earning	  less	  than	  2	  
minimum	  wages	  
Census	  full	  survey	  
Source:	  Mexican	  Population	  Council	  (CONAPO).	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Construction	  of	  Variables	  
The	  total	  number	  of	  villages	  in	  Mexico	  has	  a	  large	  variation	  in	  every	  period	  of	  5	  years,	  particularly	  those	  
with	  less	  than	  50	  inhabitants.	  It	  was	  only	  considered	  these	  villages	  as	  the	  universe	  and	  did	  not	   include	  
new	  villages	  created	  between	  2000	  and	  2005.	  The	  criteria	  used	   for	   the	  selection	  of	  villages	  eligible	   to	  
the	  program	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  the	  used	  in	  1997	  in	  the	  original	  design	  of	  the	  program	  and	  are	  the	  
following:	  
1.	  Rural.	  Villages	  with	  less	  than	  2500	  inhabitants	  but	  more	  than	  50.	  This	  criterion	  would	  guarantee	  the	  
minimum	  people	  required	  for	  the	  correct	   functioning	  of	  the	  program.	  Total	  villages	   in	  1995	  that	  meet	  
this	  criterion	  were	  50,666	  with	  partial	  information	  for	  2000	  and	  2005.	  
2.	   Eligible.	   Villages	   classified	   in	   middle,	   high	   and	   very	   high	   marginalization	   (poverty)	   with	   access	   to	  
health	   clinics	   and	   schools	   in	   order	   to	  being	   able	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   conditions	  of	   the	  program.	   Total	  
villages	   in	  1995	  that	  meet	  this	  criterion	  were	  29,791;	  the	  survivors	   in	  2000	  were	  29,276	  and	  28,997	  in	  
2005.	  However,	  some	  other	  villages	  (classified	  as	  low	  and	  very	  low	  marginalization)	  also	  included	  some	  
families	  in	  the	  program.	  
Variables	  	  
Total	   adult	   population.	   This	   variable	   describes	   the	  population	  born	  before	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  
program	   in	   1997.	   It	   includes	   total	   population	   in	   1995,	   population	   older	   than	   5	   years	   old	   in	   2000	   and	  
population	  older	  than	  10	  years	  old	  in	  2005.	  	  
Progresa.	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   is	   reported	  by	   village	   in	   every	  phase	  and	  at	   the	  end	  of	   every	   fiscal	  
year.	  This	  variable	  refers	  average	  number	  of	  families	  included	  in	  the	  program	  in	  the	  village.	  	  
44	  
	  
Coverage	   of	   Progresa.	   Variable	   defined	   as	   “coverage”.	   This	   variable	   refers	   to	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	  
program	  by	   village	  as	   a	  percent	  of	   the	   total	   households	   included	   in	   the	   census	  1995	  and	  used	  as	   the	  
baseline	  for	  the	  rollout	  program.	  The	  average	  values	  are	  0	  for	  1995,	  0.32	  in	  2000	  and	  0.63	  in	  2005.	  
Other	  explanatory	  variables.	  
Indicator	   variables	   of	   the	   program.	   Variable	   defined	   as	   “ind_prog”.	   It	   indicates	   if	   there	   is	   at	   least	   10	  
percent	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  households	  covered	  by	  Progresa.	  The	  values	  are	  zero	  for	  1995	  and	  one	  













Indicator	  variables	  of	  inclusion	  of	  the	  village	  in	  the	  program.	  Variable	  defined	  as	  “inclusion”.	  It	  indicates	  
if	  the	  program	  is	  present.	  The	  values	  are	  zero	  for	  1995	  and	  one	  for	  2000	  and	  2005.	  
Indicator	  variables	  of	  the	  program.	  Male	  ratio	  indicates	  the	  ratio	  of	  males	  and	  females	  of	  the	  population	  
















The	  value	  of	  this	  ratio	  decreased	  from	  1.03	  to	  0.95	  during	  the	  period.	  
Poverty.	  This	  continuous	  variable	  refers	  to	  the	  poverty	  level	  of	  the	  village	  in	  every	  period.	  It	  goes	  from	  1	  
to	   5,	   where	   the	   lowest	   represents	   villages	   with	   lower	   levels	   of	   poverty	   and	   5	   the	   highest.	   The	  
discontinuity	   approach	   uses	   different	   ranges	   between	   values	   4	   and	   3	   to	   see	   difference	   in	   the	  
demographic	  change.	  Villages	  in	  the	  RDD	  vicinity	  showed	  a	  reduction	  from	  2.61	  in	  1995	  to	  2.54	  in	  2005.	  	  
	  
